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El objetivo de este artículo es responder una pregunta básica que no 
sólo se hacen los brasileros, sino también personas en otros países 
en desarrollo en los cuales se sobrevaluaron las agendas de reforma 
liberales, la pregunta es: ¿por qué China ha crecido tan rápidamente 
y Brasil no? En la primera sección se establecen las bases para 
comparar Brasil y China contextualizando estos países dentro del 
concepto del BRIC. La segunda sección tiene como objetivo una 
explicación parcial, midiendo los resultados de crecimiento de una 
generación hija del Consenso de Washington. Dado el agnosticismo 
sobre los paquetes totalmente liberales y el enigma de por qué los 
reformadores incompletos crecieron mas, el artículo se sumerge en un 
análisis comparativo de las reformas brasileras y chinas enfocándose 
únicamente en el tema de política macroeconómica, especialmente 
los regímenes monetario y cambiarlo, y sus efectos en el crecimiento 
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en la tercera sección. Es decir, la experiencia brasilera con los re­

gímenes de inflación objetivo y tipo de cambio flexible, desde 1999 

ha contribuido a un crecimiento lento de pare y siga además de un~ 

infl?ción relativamente alta, mientras que el enfoque favorecido por 

Chma, mas controlado, ha producido lo contrario. Finalmente, el 

artículo concluye ofreciendo consejos de política económica a otros 

países en desarrollo, los del BRIC, el N-11, u otros. 






This .~aper aims to answer a very basic question asked by not only 
Brazlhans, but people in other developing countries where liberal re­
form age~das were oversold, namely: why has China grown so rapidly 
and Brazll not. The first section establishes the basis for comparison 
between China and Brazil by contextualizing these countries within 
the BRIC~ concept. The second section aims at a partíal explanatíon 
by surveymg the results of a generation ofWashington Consensus era 
growth. Given the agnosticism about total liberal packages and the 
puzzle ofwhy incomplete reformers grew better, the paper engages in 
a comp~rative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese reforms focusing only 
on the Issue of macroeconomic policy, especially the monetary and 
exchange rate regimes, and its effect on growth in the third section. 
That is, the Brazilian experience with inflation targeting and flexible 
exchange rate regime, sínce 1999, has contributed to slow start-stop 
growth and has been relatively high inflation, while the more managed 
approaches favored by China have done the reverse. Finally, the paper 
concludes offering policy advice to the other developing countries, 
BRICs, N-11, or otherwise. 
Key words: China, Brazil, economic policy, economic growth. 
JEL: E44, F43. 
Introduction 
In November 2001, Jim Q'Neill and his colleagues at Goldman 
Sach~ argued that global convergence trends augured well for 
cert~l~ large emerging markets and that these would soon displace 
tradltl~nal Europea~ economies and¡ in one case¡ even Japan and 
th,e ~mted States, In terms of market size by the year 2050 (see 
Q ~elll, 2007). These countries, namely Brazíl, Russia, India, and 
China (known by the acronym BRICs), were likely to offer some 
of the best investment opportunities in the coming decades. The 
team continued to 'dream' of BRICs over the next few years, pro-
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ducing a number of papers which reinforced their original argume 
through new favorable data (Wilson and Purushothaman, 200 
Q'Neill, Wilson, Purushothaman and Stupnystka, 2005). In 200 
they published Brics and Beyond, a fulHength book which collectl 
essays tllat analyzed the trajectories of the BRICs countries, t 
N-ll (11 other countries that have growth potential), and oth 
possible markets. In the introduction, Jim Q'Neill wrote that sin 
the original paper on the BRICs countries was written, the equ 
markets in the BRICs countries had expanded trem@ndously 
Brazil by 369.0%, India by 49.0%, Russía by 630.0%, and Chí 
by 201.0% - see Q'Neill, 2007: 5) and that Goldman Sachs ce 
tínues to be bullísh about them. 
Brazilians, on the other hand, who have heard that their countr¡ 
the country of the future for more than half a century, are likely 
ask what sort of impossible dream Goldman Sachs ís selling. Af 
all, regardless of equity market growth, between 2000 and 2C 
Brazil averaged only 3.1% economic growth. Goldman Sachs' Pa 
Leme was sanguine about this, writing "Brazll has underperforrr 
not only relative to our expectations but also compared with all1 
other BRICs. Since 2003, real GOP growth rates in China, In 
and Russia have averaged 10.2%, 8.0% and 6.9%, in each ce 
far exceeding our estimates of their long-term potential (4.9 
5.8% and 3.5%, respectively) 11 (Leme¡ 2007 1 : 75). Leme expec 
Brazil to reach a target 5.0% economic growth, given the succ 
of macroeconomic stabilization programs¡ though he believed t 
the second Lula da Silva government would be unlikely to carry 
the reforms necessary to allow for an acceleration of growth. 
This paper aims to answer a very basic question asked by not e 
Brazilians, but people in other developing countries where libl 
reform agendas were oversold, namely: why has China growr 
rapidly and Brazil noto Section 1 establishes the basis for comp 
son between China and Brazil by contextualizing these count 
within the BRICs concepto An ínteresting point of divergence am 
the BRICs is in the area of economic growth and reforms: the 8 
countries which pursued liberal reforms more aggressively 
holistically (Russia and Brazil in the 19905) grew far slower t 
those who were more heterodox (China si nce the 19805, and 11 
in the 19905). This is counter-intuitive since conventíonal wis( 
holds that China and India's growth have largely been the resu 
1 Leme wrote this essay in 2006 but it was published wlth the rest of this book in ~ 
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November 2001, Jim Q'Neill and his colleagues at Goldman 
~chs argued that global convergence trends augured well for 
rt~i.n large emerging markets and that these would soon displace 
~dltl~nal Europea.n economies and, in one case, even Japan and 
e ~nlted States, In terms of market size by the year 2050 (see 
~eJlI, 2007). These countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India, and 
IIna (known by the acronym BRICs), were likely to offer some 
the best investment opportunities in the coming decades. The 
~m continued to 'dream' of BRICs over the next few years, pro-
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ducing a number of papers which reinforced their original argument 
through new favorable data (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003; 
Q'Neill, Wilson, Purushothaman and Stupnystka, 2005). In 2007, 
they published Brics and Beyond, a fulHength book which collected 
essays that analyzed the trajectories of the BRICs countries, the 
N-ll (11 other countries that have growth potential), and other 
possible markets. In the introduction, Jim Q'Neill wrote that since 
the original paper on the BRICs countries was written, the equity 
markets in the BRICs countries had expanded trempndously (in 
Brazil by 369.0%, India by 49.0%, Russia by 630.0%, and China 
by 201.0% - see Q'Nei", 2007: 5) and that Goldman Sachs con­
tinues to be bullish about them. 
Brazilians, on the other hand, who have heard that their country is 
the country of the future for more than half a century, are likely to 
ask what sort of impossible dream Goldman Sachs is selling. After 
all, regardless of equity market growth, between 2000 and 2006 
Brazil averaged only 3.1% economic growth. Goldman Sachs' Paulo 
Leme was sanguine about this, writing "Brazil has underperformed 
not only relative to our expectations but also compared with aH the 
other BRICs. Since 2003, real GDP growth rates in China, India 
and Russia have averaged 10.2%, 8.0% and 6.9%, in each case 
far exceeding our estimates of their long-term potential (4.9%, 
5.8% and 3.5%, respectively)" (Leme, 20071: 75). Leme expected 
Brazil to reach a target 5.0% economic growth, given the success 
of macroeconomic stabilization programs, though he believed that 
the second Lula da Silva government would be unlikely to carry out 
the reforms necessary to allow for an acceleration of growth. 
This paper aims to answer a very basic question asked by not only 
Brazilians, but people in other developing countries where liberal 
reform agendas were oversold, namely: why has China grown so 
rapidly and Brazil noto Section 1 establishes the basis for compari­
son between China and Brazil by contextualizing these countries 
within the BRICs concepto An interesting point of divergence among 
the BRICs is in the area of economic growth and reforms: the BRIC 
countries which pursued liberal reforms more aggressively and 
holistically (Russia and Brazil in the 1990s) grew far slower than 
those who were more heterodox (China since the 19805, and India 
in the 1990s). This is counter-intuitive since conventional wisdom 
holds that China and India's growth have largely been the result of 
1 Leme wrote thís essay In 2006 but it was published wlth the rest of thls book in 2007. 
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freeing Up their economies. Section 2 aims at a partial explanation 
by surveying the results of a generatíon of Washington Consensus 
era growth. Something approaching a consensus now exists over 
the lack of effectiveness of universally applicable holistic reform 
programs. Given the agnostícism about total liberal packages and 
the puzzle of why incomplete reformers grew better, the paper 
engages in a comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese reforms 
focusing on the issue of macroeconomic policy, especially monetary 
and exchange rate regimes, and its effect on growth in Section 32 • 
That is, the inflation targeting and flexible exchange rate regime 
used by the Brazilian government, since 1999, has contributed to 
slow start-stop growth and has been relatively high inflation¡ while 
the more managed approaches favored by China have done the 
reverse. Finally, the paper concludes offering policy advice to the 
other developing countries¡ BRICs, N-11¡ or otherwise. 
Not another BRIC in the wall 
The appeal of the concept of BRICs countries to international 
busínessmen is straightforward: these four countries possess 
sufficient market size and ability to influence and be influenced 
by the international economy to make them attractive sites for 
investment. Once proposed as a group¡ the concept of BRICs was 
quickly adopted by economists and investment banks (O'Neill, Wil­
son, Purushothaman and Stupnystka, 2005; O'Neill, 2007). It has 
resonance with other social scientists who have long distinguished 
important developing countries from smaller and less important 
peers (Chase, Híll and Kennedy, 2000; Armijo, 2007). 
In many aspects, such as historical legacies, culture, and regime 
type, to name but a few, there is little to bind the BRIC countries. 
In the area of policy reform¡ howeve~ there are certain important 
similarities though they produce varied results. This section will 
show the considerable similarities in economic pathways pursued 
by otherwise very different governments -establishing a strong 
commonality in economic policy choice- and the very glaring 
divergence in terms of economic outcomes. Thus, despite the 
obvious differences of the BRICs, this analysis of economic poli­
2 It is important to mention that this paper aims to explain the difference in economic 
growth performance in Brazil and China by analyzing and comparing only the macroeco­
nomic policy that has been implemented in the Brazilían and Chinese economies since 
the 1990s. It does not mean¡ however, that some economic reforms, such as, tax reform, 
labor reform and social securíty reform and labor costs and productívity are not relevant 
to explain the growth rates in Brazil and China. 
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cy reform can be consídered an interesting case of most slmi 
analysis (Gerring, 2007: chapter 5). Most similar case analy~ 
approaches offer significant leverage because they are well ~ 
sitioned to explore causal mechanisms that may, be obscured 
studies with high numbers of cases (Iarge N studles, George a 
Bennett, 2005). This is particularly important becau~e of the 
determinacy that large N studies (see the next sectlon) show 
terms of liberalization and growth in general. 
AII four countries had economies where sta te intervention \11 
considerable up until the 19805 (Brazil and China) or 19905 (RI 
sia and India) and all have moved considerably in favor of free 
market actors and reducing the role of the state. The governm~ 
in each of these countries entered the post-World War,II perli 
with a very clear awareness of a need to catch up and wlth a be 
that governments should either actively fill mark~t .gaps or ti 
they should wholesale collectivize productlve a~~lvlty. Pos~ \J 
policies involved state-Ied growth through an:bltIC:~us multl-y 
industrialization plans with considerable ,vanet~ In de~ree~ 
success. AII pursued policies that were deCld~dIY.lnward I,n on 
tation and Brazil¡ India and China, diSplaye? Ilttle ~nterest In tra 
save tradítional sectors which were increaslngly dlsadvan~agec 
macroeconomic policies. The Soviet Uníon ec~nomy, whlle m 
global in orientation, understood its trad~ profile as part of a, 
ger context of Communist solidarity and ItS tra?~ was determl~ 
by political motivations more 50 than b~ tradltlon~1 con~ern; 
price productivity and quality. Thus¡ whlle the Soviet Umon 
engaged in trade, it did so through th~ ~ouncil of Mutual Econo 
Assistance, a relatively closed assoClatlon. 
In addition to being relatively closed economies, credit had b 
cheaply provided through the extensive presence o~ gove~nrr 
in credit markets. Public development banks (Brazll, Indl,a, 
China) or government monopolies in banking (USSR) dlrec 
low cost capital to sectors favored by ~ov~rnment plans. W 
planning was more significant and effectlv~ In th~ USS~ and II 
then in China3 and Brazil¡ in al! cases¡ pnvate finan~lal ,marl 
were 'repressed' (Beim and Calomiris¡ 2000). The nse In ~h 
interest rates, sharp fall in oil prices and global cons~mptlo 
the early 19805 exposed many structural weakness~s In t~e 
deis pursued by all four countries. ParticularlYI varylng mlxtl 
3 FO~ comp~~n~ comparison of planning in the USSR and China see Hui (2005) .. 
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reeing Up their economies. Section 2 aims at a partíal explanation 
Iy surveyíng the results of a generatíon of Washington Consensus 
,ra growth. Somethíng approaching a consensus now exists over 
he lack of effectiveness of universally applicable holistic reform 
Irograms. Given the agnosticism about total liberal packages and 
he puzzle of why incomplete reformers grew better/ the paper 
:ngages in a comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese reforms 
:lcusing on the issue of macroeconomic policy, especially monetary 
Ind exchange rate regimes, and its effect on growth in Section 32 • 
'hat is, the inflation targeting and flexible exchange rate regime 
lsed by the Brazilian government, since 1999, has contributed to 
low start-stop growth and has been relatively high inflation, while 
he more managed approaches favored by China have done the 
everse. Finally, the paper concludes offeríng policy advice to the 
)ther developing countries, BRICs, N-ll, or otherwise. 
I/ot another BRIC in the wall 
'he appeal of the concept of BRICs countries to international 
lusinessmen is straightforward: these four countries possess 
iufficient market size and ability to influence and be influenced 
IY the international economy to make them attractive sites for 
:westment, Once proposed as a group, the concept of BRICs was 
!uíckly adopted by economists and investment banks (O'Neill, Wil­
:en, Purushothaman and Stupnystka, 2005; O/Neill, 2007). It has 
esonance with other social scientists who have long distinguished 
llportant developing countries from smaller and less important 
leers (Chase, Hill and Kennedy, 2000; Armijo, 2007). 
n many aspects, such as historical legacies, culture, and regime 
tt'pe, to name but a few, there is little to bind the BRIC countries. 
n the area of policy reform, however, there are certain important 
íimílarities though they produce varied results. This section will 
Ihow the considerable similarities in economic pathways pursued 
y otherwise very different governments -establishing a strong 
ommonality in economíc polícy choice- and the very glaring 
ivergence in terms of economic outcomes. Thus, despite the 
\bvious differences of the BRICs, this analysis of economic poli-
l. It is important to mention that this paper aims to explain the difference in economic 
rowth performance in Brazil and China by analyzing and comparing only the macroeco­
~ 
mic policy that has been implemented in the Brazilian and Chinese economies since 
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cy reform can be consídered an ínteresting case of most simil~r 
analysis (Gerring, 2007: chapter 5). Most similar case analysls 
approaches offer significant leverage because they are well p?­
sitioned to explore causal mechanisms that may be obscured m 
studies with high numbers of cases (Iarge N studies, George and 
Bennett, 2005). This is particularly important because of the in­
determinacy that large N studies (see the next section) show in 
terms of liberalization and growth in general. 
Al! four countries had economies where state íntervention was 
considerable up until the 19805 (Brazil and China) or 19905 (Rus­
sia and India) and all have moved considerably in favor of freeing 
market actors and reducing the role of the state. The governments 
in each of these countries entered the post-World War 11 period, 
with a very clear awareness of a need to catch up and with a belief 
that governments should either actively fill market gaps or that 
they should wholesale collectivize productive activity. Post War 
policies involved state-Ied growth through ambitious multi-year 
índustríalization plans with considerable variety in degrees of 
success. AII pursued policies that were decidedly inward in orien­
tation and Brazil, India and China, displayed little interest in trade, 
save traditional sectors which were increasingly disadvantaged by 
macroeconomic policies. The Soviet Uníon economy, while more 
global in orientation, understood its trade profile as part of a.lar­
ger context of Communist solidarity and its trade was determmed 
by polítical motivations more so than by traditional concerns of 
price, productivity and quality. Thus, while the Soviet Union w~s 
engaged in trade, it did so through the Council of Mutual Economlc 
Assistance, a relatively closed assocíation. 
In addition to being relatively closed economies, credit had been 
cheaply provided through the extensive presence of government 
in credit markets. Public development banks (Brazil, India, and 
China) or government monopolies ín banking (USSR) directed 
low cost capital to sectors favored by government plans. While 
planning was more significant and effective in the USSR and India 
then in China3 and Brazil, in all cases, priva te financial markets 
were 'repressed' (Beim and Calomiris, 2000). The rise in global 
interest rates, sharp fall in oil prices and global consumption in 
the early 19805 exposed many structural weaknesses in the mo­
deis pursued by al! four countries. Particularly, varying mixtures 
3 For a compelling comparison of planning in the USSR and Chma see Hui (2005). 
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of increased indebtedness to external creditors, rising inflation, 
food. and goods shortages, and persístent fiscal deficits plagued 
Bra~II, the USSR, and India, while China suffered from rising in­
flatlon¡ .and heavy state and quasi-state debt. A perception that 
d?mestlc market processes had been exhausted, inability to access 
viable external credit markets, and external shocks lead to crises 
in the four countries encouraged all of these governments to pur­
sue ~eform (Brazil 19805, 19905, 1998-9,2002-3; USSR 19805; 
Russla 1991-1999; India 1990-2; and. China 1981, 1989-1992 
the latter being m?re domestic in orientation). Overwhelmingly: 
the re~or~s prescnbed by economists and policy makers involved 
Irberallzatlon (of labor, financial, capital, foreign exchange markets, 
to name a few). 
The BRICs countries differed in the speed, pace, and content of the 
reforms that they implemented, as well as the amount of pressure 
they endured from international financial institutions and trading 
part~ers. Nevertheless, all moved towards liberalizing their eco­
nomles to degrees unknown by any of those countries for most of 
the twentieth centu~. Im~ortantly, all moved towards transforming 
state-owned enterpnses rnto private or mixed partnerships whose 
perf~r~anc~ woul~ be determined by market rather than polítical 
condltlons, tncreastng the role of domestic and foreign (China to a 
lesser extent) ~articipation in capital markets, felixibilizing labor 
~ontracts and nghts, and welcoming foreign and domestic private 
Investment, particularly in industries once considered sensitive or 
part of national security (again, China to a much lesser extent). 
Given these similarities, what is telling is the stark difference in 
economic growth. over the last decade. More specifically, given 
that the explanatlon of the growth of China and India is normally 
understood as the result of liberalization, it is important to address 
why liberalization did not have the same effect in Brazil and Russia 
(in the 19905). Table 2 (annex) shows the remarkable difference 
in economic growth performance of the more liberal and holistic 
reformers (Brazil and Russia under Yeltsin) and the more hete­
rodox reformers (China, India, and Russia under Putin). Even if 
the Russian case is not considered due to its heavy dependence 
on petroleum and natural gas prices, the contrast between Brazil 
and ~ndia and China is stark. Before turning a focused comparison 
on dlfferences between Brazilían and Chinese reforms it is worth 
:evi~wi.ng the literature on reforms and economic gr~wth to see 
If thrs Ilterature provides an answer, or at least sorne clues as to 
why Brazil is not just another BRIC in the wall. ' 
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Econom;c reform agendas and econom;c growth 
The trend to liberalize in the 19805 was thought to be the reme' 
to the problems of stagflation. Stagflation was a problem in d 
veloped countries but it was devastating in developing countri 
where growth shocks were more pronounced, inflation rates WE 
much higher, citizens had fewer savings, and governments h 
currencies which were ineffective stores of value. The need 
resume growth was, thus, more pressing in developing countri 
but the usual small-scale reforms seemed inadequate to sol 
egregious levels of price instability, deteriorating currency vall 
and slow or negative growth. In short, developing countries fae 
graver problems and had fewer policy instruments available 
address those problems. 
Policy makers centered in Washington and many US-trained 
chnocrats in developing countries believed that structural refor 
were needed, reforms that would liberalize markets and ration. 
zing the state activity. The assumption was that this would redl 
inflation and allow growth to return. Though it has been sever 
vilified in retrospect, the Washington Consensus was primarily 
attempt to show the consensus among economists about the nE 
to correct structural weaknesses and restore growth (Willíams 
2002). Certain commonalities existed among the many countl 
and regions in the world which had been hit hard by the rise ir 
prices, the global recession in the early 19805, and its aftermé 
These conditions included high or hyper-inflation, overvalued 
change rates, excessive indebtedness (often incurred in afore 
currency), rigid labor markets¡ inefficient tax collecting agenc 
and lack of credibllity of monetary policy makers, among oth~ 
Many reformers believed that state intervention in markets 
distorted incentives creating conditions of moral hazard, crowe 
out private actors, and prioritizing employment over producti\ 
At the same time, a remarkable consensus emerged among E 
nomists that favored positions held by classical economists -s 
as that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon (Blust 
2003). The increased consensus around liberal ideas, the rise 
scientific and mathematical approach to economics, the colla 
of cornmand economies in Europe, and the liberalization of CI 
reinforced an impression of technical infallibility to economic thE 
(Guilhot, 2005). Economists and policy makers spoke of get 
the (macroeconornic) 'fundamentals' correct or getting pr 
'right.' In such an environment, the Washington Consensus qui 
moved from ten policies which emerge from a sum of cumulé 
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?f increased indebtedness to externa I creditors, rising inflation, 
'ood, and goods shortages, and persistent fiscal deficits plagued 
3razll, the USSR, and India, whi/e China suffered from rising in­
latlon, ,and heavy state and quasi-state debt. A perception that 
~?mestlc market processes had been exhausted, inability to access 
lIable external credit markets, and externa I shocks lead to críses 
n the four countries encouraged all of these governments to pur­
;ue reform (Brazil 1980s, 1990s, 1998-9, 2002-3; USSR 19805; 
(ussia 1991-1999; India 1990-2; and China 1981 1989-1992 
he latter being m?re domestic in orientation). Ov~rwhelmingly: 
he reforms prescnbed by economists and policy makers involved 
beralization (of labor, financíal, capital, foreign exchange markets, 
o name a few). 
"he BRICs countríes differed in the speed, pace, and content of the 
eforms that they implemented, as well as the amount of pressure 
hey endured from international financial institutions and trading 
'art~ers. Nevertheless, al! moved towards liberalizing their eco­
omles to degrees unknown by any of those countries for most of 
le twentíeth century. Importantly, all moved towards transforming 
tate-owned enterprises into prívate or mixed partnerships whose 
erf~r~anc~ woul~ be determined by market rather than polítical 
Jndltlons, Increaslng the role of domestic and foreign (China to a 
!sser extent) participation in capital markets, felixíbilizing labor 
)ntracts and rights, and welcoming foreign and domestic prívate 
Ivestment, partícularly in industries once considered sensitive or 
3rt of nationa/ securíty (again, China to a much /esser extent). 
iven these similarities, what is telling is the stark difference in 
:onomic growth, over the last decade. More specifically, given 
lat the exp/anatlon of the growth of China and India is normally 
lderstood as the result of liberalization, it is important to address 
hy liberalization did not have the same effect in Brazil and Russia 
1 the 19905). Table 2 (annex) shows the remarkable difference 
economic growth performance of the more liberal and holistic 
formers (Brazil and Russia under Yeltsin) and the more hete­
dox reformers (China, India, and Russia under Putin). Even if 
e Russian case is not considered due to its heavy dependen ce 
I petroleum and natural gas prices, the contrast between Brazil 
d ~ndia and China is stark. Before turning a focused comparison 
dlfferences between Brazilian and Chinese reforms it is worth 
v'i~wi,ng the literature on reforms and economic gr~wth to see 
:hls Ilterature provides an answer, or at least some elues as to 
Iy Brazil is not just another BRIC in the wall. ' 
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Economic reform agendas and economic growth 
The trend to liberalize in the 1980s was thought to be the remedy 
to the problems of stagflation. Stagtlation was a problem in de­
veloped countries but it was devastating in developíng countries 
where growth shocks were more pronounced, inflation rates were 
much higher, citizens had fewer savings, and governments had 
currencies which were ineffective stores of value. The need to 
resume growth was, thus, more pressing in developing countries 
but the usual small-scale reforms seemed inadequate to solve 
egregious levels of price instability, deteriorating currency value, 
and slow or negative growth. In short, developing countries faced 
graver problems and had fewer policy instruments available to 
address those problems. 
Policy makers centered in Washington and many US-trained te­
chnocrats in developing countries believed that structural reforms 
were needed, reforms that would líberalize markets and rationali­
zing the state activity. The assumption was that this would reduce 
inflation and allow growth to return. Though it has been severely 
vilified in retrospect, the Washington Consensus was primarily an 
attempt to show the consensus among economists about the need 
to correct structural weaknesses and restore growth (Williamson, 
2002). Certain commonalities existed among the many countries 
and regions in the world which had been hit hard by the rise in oil 
prices, the global recession in the early 1980s, and its aftermath. 
These conditions included high or hyper-inflation, overvalued ex­
change rates, excessive indebtedness (often incurred in a foreign 
currency), rigid labor markets, inefficient tax collecting agencies, 
and lack of credibility of monetary policy makers, among others. 
Many reformers believed that state intervention in markets had 
distorted incentives creating conditions of mora/ hazard, crowding 
out private actors, and prioritizing employment over productivity. 
At the same time, a remarkable consensus emerged among eco­
nomists that favored positions held by classical econom ists -such 
as that inflation is primaríly a monetary phenomenon (Blusteín, 
2003). The increased consensus around liberal ideas, the rise of a 
scientific and mathematica/ approach to economics, the co/lapse 
of command economies in Europe, and the liberalization of China 
reinforced an impression of technical infallibility to economic theory 
(Guilhot, 2005). Economists and po/icy makers spoke of getting 
the (macroeconomic) 'fundamenta/s' correct or getting príces 
'ríght.' In such an environment, the Washington Consensus quick/y 
moved from ten policies which emerge from a sum of cumulative 
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wisdom of the discipline of economics to a complete set of rules to 
b~ followed closely and in tandem 4 • Not without some credibility 
dld supporters and critics call it the "Ten Commandments". 
~roblems emerged relatively rapidly beca use although economists 
knew' that .these prescriptions were correct, evidence was weak 
and, sometlmes, contradictory. Stallings and Peres (2000) found 
that some reforms had positive effects on growth and inequality 
whereas o~hers ~id noto This led to debates about the importanc~ 
of sequenClng, wlth authors arguing thát certain reforms needed to 
be.done before others. Political scientists and polítical economists 
pOlnted to the absence of attention to institutions and argued that 
rule of law, a competent judiciary, governability, and other issues 
were neces~ary. fo~ economic transitions (Haggard and Webb, 
1994). Such Instltutlonal reforms were considered 'complementary' 
and part of a.'s~cond generation' (Krueger¡ 2000). These reforms 
we~e more ~Ifficult bec.ause they involved more political maneu­
venng a.nd Implementln~ governments required more polítical 
support In order to sustaln such changes. Finally, another debate 
emerged, based largely on comparative analyses of the experien­
ces of the P~ople's Republic of China and the former Soviet Union 
Bloc countnes, about the virtue of 'shock therapy' versus gradual 
reform (Nolan, 1995; Aslund, 2002; Hui, 2005). 
Interestingly, most proponents in the various debates believed that 
reforms wer~ g?od, necessary, and applicable ín all cases. The 
problem lay In. tlming, polítical will, or passing additional reforms 
to make the first .set work more efficiently. The crisis in Asia in 
199? bega.n to chip away at that perspective. Harvard economist 
Dan! Rodn~ I~d the charge against blind support of liberalism 
and globallzatlon (Rodrik, 1998) arguing that particular policy 
app~oaches might work better than a dogmatic set of policies. 
Partlcula~ly challenging to liberals, though somewhat overstated, 
was the Importance played by capital controls in the Malaysian 
response and recovery (Haggard, 2000). This sparked a debate 
amon~ economists (Larr~ín, 2?00) about the virtue or dangers 
of ca~ltal controls, but dlscusslons of holistic problems with the 
Washington Consensus were largely muted, though it was clear 
that. problems abou~ded. The cOllapse of Argentina in 2001 was 
partlcu.larly traumatlc because the stylized impression was that 
Argentina had been a 'poster child' of the Washington Consensus 
4 This does not mean that countries indeed followed all ten. In fact, most countries em ha­
slzed only a few poltcles though there were less dedicated efforts to complete the liS~. 
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and if it -and its convertibility system- was dead and buried, ~ 
should 'neoliberalism' (see Blustein, 2006). 
Joseph Stiglitz unleashed a number of critiques of the Washingt< 
Consensus which were particularly important given his position 
former Chief Economist at the World Bank. Stiglitz (2002) sugge 
ted a number of reforms, a 'post-Washington Consensus,' whi 
were more likely to produce sustainable and equitable develo 
mento In a reflective piece, Williamson (2002) replied by recogl 
zing that on certain policies he may have overstated the amOL 
of consensus among economists¡ but he largely stood by the t 
principies he initially laid out. What is rather remarkable is tt 
not only Williamson, but many of his critics, believed that there 
a particular set of reforms will bring about growth although e 
dence increasingly suggested otherwise. They disagreed on wh 
reforms and the pace and sequencing, but there is a considera 
amount of faith in reform agendas writ large. Particularlyexe 
plary of such faith-based economics can be found in Williamso 
reflections on the Washington Consensus ten years later in wh 
he writes "in practice there would probably not have been a 
difference if 1 had undertaken a similar exercise for Africa or A~ 
(Williamson, 2000: 255, quoted in Rodríguez, 2006: 2). 
And yet, the path to growth does not seem to be paved with < 
set of reform policies. In a series of articles, Easterly shows t 
stabilization and adjustment programs and economic reforms 
not effect growth, and the income of developing countries in 2( 
is remarkably correlated (0.87) with their 1960 income (see rev 
in Sindzingre, 2005: 284). Hausmann and Rodrik find that desl 
being "a star reformer" El Salvador was not a "star perforrr 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2005: 43) and in a comparative anal 
of El Salvador, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic, (HauSmé 
Rodrik and Velasco¡ 2005) show how implementíng certaín 
rrect' reforms could actually be harmful. In theír study of refo 
in Latín America, Stallings and Peres (2000) found that refo 
lacked perfect complementarity, and that financial liberaliza 
often had negative effects. Similarly¡ using a larger data 
Eichengreen and Leblang (2002) and Rodrik (1998) show 
it is difficult to establish a robust relationship between finar 
liberalization and economic growth performance for develc 
and, especially, emerging countries. Examining all regions f 
1975-2000, Rodríguez (2006) argues that the data correlé 
openness and economic growth is very inconclusive. 
ENSAYOS DE ECONOMIA No 3~, 2008: 15-41 
22 Why Brazíl Has Not Grown: A Comparative Analysis ... 
Nisdom of the discipline of economics to a complete set of rules to 
J~ followed closely and in tandem 4 • Not without some credibility 
jld supporters and critics call it the "Ten Commandments". 
?roblems emerged relatively rapidly because although economists 
knew' that these prescriptions were correct, evidence was weak 
:md, sometimes, contradictory. Stallíngs and Peres (2000) found 
:hat some reform.s had positive effects on growth and inequality, 
Nhereas others dld noto This led to debates about the importance 
Jf sequencing, with authors arguíng that certain reforms needed to 
Je done before others. Polítical scíentísts and political economists 
Jointed to the absence of attention to institutions and argued that 
"ule of law, a competent judiciary, governability, and other issues 
Nere necessary for economic transitions (Haggard and Webb 
1994). Such institutional reforms were considered 'complementarv" 
:md part of a 'second generation' (Krueger, 2000). These reforms 
.vere more dífficult because they ínvolved more polítícal maneu­
veríng and implementíng governments requíred more polítícal 
;;upport in order to sustain such changes. Finally, another debate 
emerged, based largely on comparative analyses of the experien­
:es of the People's Republic of China and the former Soviet Uníon 
Bloc countries, about the vírtue of 'shock therapy' versus gradual 
'"eform (Nolan, 1995; Aslund, 2002; Hui, 2005). 
[nterestíngly, most proponents in the various debates believed that 
:eforms were good, necessary, and applicable in al! cases. The 
problem lay in timing, political will, or passing additional reforms 
:0 make the first set work more efficiently. The crisis in Asia in 
11.997 began to chip away at that perspective. Harvard economist 
:>ani Rodrik led the charge against blind support of liberalism 
and globalization (Rodrik, 1998) arguing that particular policy 
;.:¡pproaches might work better than a dogmatic set of policies. 
::>articularly challenging to liberals, though somewhat overstated 
~as the importance played by capital control s in the MalaYSia~ 
esponse and recovery (Haggard, 2000). This sparked a debate 
mong economists (Larraín, 2000) about the virtue or dangers 
, f capital controls, but discussions of holistic problems with the 
Washington Consensus were largely muted, though it was clear 
~hat problems abounded. The collapse of Argentina in 2001 was 
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and if it -and its convertibility system- was dead and buried, SO 
should 'neoliberalísm' (see Blustein, 2006). 
Joseph Stiglitz unleashed a number of critiques of the Washington 
Consensus which were particularly important given his position as 
former Chief Economist at the World Bank. Stiglitz (2002) sugges­
ted a number of reforms, a 'post-Washington Consensus,' which 
were more likely to produce sustainable and equitable develop­
mento In a reflective piece, Williamson (2002) replied by recogni­
zing that on certain policies he may have overstated the amount 
of consensus among economists, but he largely stood by the ten 
principies he initially laid out. What is rather remarkable is that 
not only Williamson, but many of his critícs, believed that there is 
a particular set of reforms will bring about growth although evi­
dence increasingly suggested otherwíse. They disagreed on which 
reforms and the pace and sequencing, but there is a considerable 
amount of faith in reform agendas writ large. Partícularly exem­
plary of such faith-based economics can be found in Williamson's 
reflections on the Washington Consensus ten years later in which 
he writes "in practice there would probably not have been a lot 
difference if 1 had undertaken a similar exercise for Africa or Asia" 
(Williamson, 2000: 255, quoted in Rodríguez, 2006: 2). 
And yet, the path to growth does not seem to be paved with one 
set of reform policies. In a series of articles, Easterly shows that 
stabilization and adjustment programs and economic reforms do 
not effect growth, and the income of developing countries in 2000 
is remarkably correlated (0.87) with their 1960 income (see review 
in Sindzingre, 2005: 284). Hausmann and Rodrik find that despite 
being "a star reformer" El Salvador was not a "star performer" 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2005: 43) and in a comparative analysis 
of El Salvador, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic, (Hausmann, 
Rodrik and Velasco, 2005) show how ímplementíng certaín 'co­
rrect' reforms could actually be harmful. In their study of reforms 
in Latin America, Stallings and Peres (2000) found that reforms 
lacked perfect complementarity, and that financial liberalization 
often had negative effects. Similarly, using a larger data set, 
Eichengreen and Leblang (2002) and Rodrik (1998) show that 
ít is difficult to establish a robust relationship between financial 
liberalization and economic growth performance for developedparticularlY traumatic because the stylized impression was that and, especially, emerging countries. Examining all regions from ~rgentina had been a 'poster child' of the Washington Consensus ,	 1975-2000, Rodríguez (2006) argues that the data correlating 
openness and economic growth is very inconclusive. 
Thís does not mean ~hat countríes índeed followed al/ ten. In fact, most countries empha­

only a few pohcles though there were less dedícated efforts to complete the list. 
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This is not to say that reforms have no effect on growth, only 
that the relationship is more complex than conventional wisdom 
suggests. Wl1at is íncreasíngly evident is that large N, time se­
ries studies of economic growth provide little support for liberal 
agendas producing growth. In the case of the BRIC countries, 
the evidence is somewhat mixed. China's remarkable growth 
over the last quarter of a century ¡s, no doubt, partially due to 
liberalizing its markets and shedding a very sclerotic economic 
structure. At the same time, the Chinese state has been far too 
involved in production, regulation and planning to discount sta te 
developmentalist approaches (Onis and Senses, 2005: 270). Si­
milarly, Russian growth has occurred during periods of reversaI 
of liberalization and the reclaiming of planning on the part of the 
state (Ferdinand, 2007). Of course, most of this has consisted 
of a recovery of income to pre-collapse times and has occurred 
during a phenomenal boom in petroleum and natural gas prices 
which makes it more difficult to assess the role of the state in 
generating growth. Similarly, although Indian growth was weak in 
per capita terms for most of the pre-reform years, and has been 
robust since "there is no statistically valid break in the series in 
1991, implying that, so far, on a trend basis, GDP has continued 
to grow since 1991-2 at the same rate as it did during the pre­
vious decade -at 5.7% per year" (Nagaraj quoted in Adams, 2002: 
5). In the case of Brazil, reforms appeared piecemeal during the 
late 19805 and early 1990s. It was not until the presidency of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1994-2002) that compre­
hensive reform agenda was proposed and largely implemented 
(Spanakos, 2004). Hyperinflation was eliminated and inflation was 
brought under control, though the country remained susceptible 
to external shocks (see below). While this constituted a clear and 
palpable improvement, post-stabilization growth has been weak. 
The divergence of growth outcomes is not surprising given that 
academic literature has not found a significant improvement of 
total liberal packages on economic growth and has found some 
individual reforms to be negative. 
The next section of this paper aims to look in a more focused 
manner at two cases of macroeconomic policy reform within the 
developing world, Brazil and China, which show vastly different 
policy approaches and results. The aim here is to explore in grea­
ter depth the policies pursued by these two countries to uncover 
differences which may provide causal mechanisms that explain 
divergence in economic growth outcomes. The hypothesis is that 
while an entire set of reforms may not improve economic growth, 
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targeted ones that preserve monet~ry autonomy may have sigr 
ficant effects for developing countnes. 
The strategy o, maeroeeonomie poliey adopted by Bra~ 
and China 
Given the above discussion, it is suggested that the menu ~f lib 
ralization did not produce the growth that was expect~d wh.lle le 
liberalized systems grew more robustly. The argument IS a bit me 
precise than this as liberalization is not bad per se but reform.s 
certain areas do introduce aspects whi~h weaken growth ~USt~l~ 
bility. This section will argue that selectlve macroeconomlc poll~,1 
explain the difference in growth pe:t0rmance between the Brazlll 
and Chinese economies. Thls revives the debate ~ver exchan 
rate regimes (floating vis-a-vís manage~), and, capital control~ 
emerging markets, a debate which intenslfied glv,en exchange r~ 
and financial crises in Mexico (1994-5), East ASia (1997), Rus 
(1998), Brazil (1998-9) and Argentina (2001-02)5, 
The main outcome of this debate is that, according to the conv.E 
tional view, implementing a free-floating exchange rate regl.1 
and ample capital mobilíty, ~ve,n wh~n back~d by respons~ 
or credible economic policy -m Ime Wlt~ Washmgton Consen. 
prescriptions6-, leaves emerging countnes, prone to the hur:n 
and short-term logic of capital accumulatlon. !he, convent!o 
argument on the difficult~es fa,cing such ~ountnes ~s to attnb 
the volatility of foreign financmg to the Irresponslble econol 
policies they adopt (Caramazza and Aziz, 1998)1. The ~etero( 
view meanwhile, regards floating exchange rate and hlg~ cap 
mobility as a destabilizing combination of factors that Inten: 
5 These exchange rate and financial crises yielded a consensus among academics 
oUc makers as to the need to restructure the international monetarysystem as a 
~isp:nsable condition for the worl,d economy, andParticularl: t~h~~~~g~~i i:c~~~~~~ 

see a return to periods of expanslon and economlC prospen y, 

that the international monetary system needs restructur¡~g/, the ::~~~nt~O~n~~~~i~ 

ith re ard to the mechanisms proposed to mltl~ate ~n or pu . 
:orld e~Change and financial markets. On this pOlnt, Elchengreen (19i~' ~hafter~4! 
7) Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Davidson (1994: chapter 1.6, and 20~ . c ~p e~ .' 
Is~rd (2005: chapters 7 and 8) offer a summary of the maln optlons or res ruc unn 
international monetary system. 

6 The neoUberal measures advocated for emerging countries b.y the Washington ~~nsE 

are as follows: (i) reduction or elimination of tariff barners¡ (11) free cap.lt)a~ mO,b~lty¡ 

ther for foreign investment or for convertible currency transactlons; (111 sca ISC 
(iv) tax reform¡ (v) financial deregulation; and (VI) pnvatlzatlons. . 
7 It is im ortant to add that the conventional theory argues that a responslble ecor 
policy is based on flexible exchange rate, capital moblllty and mflatlon targetmg re! 
.-. 
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n'lis is not to say that reforms have no effect on growth, only 
that the relationship ís more complex thanconventíonal wisdom 
suggests. What is íncreasingly evident is that large I\J, time se­
ries studies of economic growth provide little support for liberal 
agendas producing growth. In the case of the BRIC countries, 
the evidence is somewhat mixed. China's remarkable growth 
:wer the last quarter of a century is¡ no doubt, partíally due to 
iberalizing its markets and shedding a very sclerotic economic 
;tructure. At the same time, the Chinese state has been far too 
nvolved in production, regulation and planning to discount state 
jevelopmentalist approaches (Onis and Senses, 2005: 270). Si­
nilarly, Russian growth has occurred during periods of reversal 
)f liberalization and the reclaiming of planning on the part of the 
;tate (Ferdínand, 2007). Of course, most of this has consisted 
)f a recovery of income to pre-collapse times and has occurred 
iuring a phenomenal boom in petroleum and natural gas prices 
vhich makes it more difficult to assess the role of the sta te in 
¡enerating growth. Similarly, although Indían growth was weak in 
)er capita terms for most of the pre-reform years¡ and has been 
obust since "there is no statistica/ly valid break in the series in 
,991¡ implying that, so far, on a trend basis, GDP has continued 
o grow since 1991-2 at the same rate as it did during the pre­
ious decade -at 5.7% per year" (Nagaraj quoted in Adams¡ 2002: 
). In the case of Brazil, reforms appeared piecemeal during the 
~te 19805 and early 1990s. It was not until the presidency of 
ernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1994-2002) that compre­
ensive reform agenda was proposed and largely implemented 
;panakos, 2004). Hyperinflation was eliminated and inflation was 
rought under control, though the country remained susceptible 
) external shocks (see below). While this constituted a clear and 
:llpable improvement¡ post-stabilization growth has been weak. 
1e divergence of growth outcomes is not surprising given that 
:ademic literature has not found a significant improvement of 
.tal liberal packages on economic growth and has found some 
dividual reforms to be negative, 
le next section of this paper aims to look in a more focused 
anner at two cases of macroeconomic policy reform within the 
weloping world, Brazil and China, which show vastly different 
)Iicy approaches and results. The aim here is to explore in grea­
r depth the po!ícies pursued by these two countries to uncover 
~ferences which may provide causal mechanisms that explain 
lIergence in economic growth outcomes. The hypothesis is that 
lile an entire set of reforms may not improve economíc growth¡ 
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targeted ones that preserve monet~ry autonomy may have signi­
ficant effects for developing countnes. 
The strategy of macroeconomic policy adopted by Brazil 
andChina 
Given the above discussion, it is suggested that the menu ?f libe­
ralization did not produce the growth that was expect~d wh,lle less 
liberalized systems grew more robustly. The argument 15 a bit mo~e 
precise than this as liberalization is not bad per se but reform,s In 
certain areas do introduce aspects which weaken growth ~ust~l~a­
bility. This section will argue that selective macroeconomlc pOII,c.,es 
explain the difference in growth performance between the Brazllian 
and Chinese economies. This revives the debate ~ver exchan~e 
rate regimes (floating vis-a-vis manage~), and, capital controls In 
emerging markets, a debate which intenslfied gl~en exchange ra~e 
and financial crises in Mexico (1994-5), East ASia (1997)/ Russla 
(1998), Brazil (1998-9) and Argentina (2001-02)5. 
The main outcome of this debate is that, according to the con~en­
tional view, implementing a free-floating exchange rate reglme 
and ample capital mobility, even wh~n back~d by responslble 
or credible economic policy -in line wlth Washington Consensus 
prescriptions6-, leaves emerging countries, prone to the hur:nors 
and short-term logic of capital accumulatlon. !he, convent,lonal 
argument on the difficulties facing such ~ountnes ~s to attnbu~e 
the volatility of foreign financing to the Irresponslble economlc 
policies they adopt (Caramazza and Aziz, 1998)1. The ,hetero~ox 
view/ meanwhile, regards floating exchange rate and h!g~ capl~al 
mobility as a destabilizing combination of factors that Intenslfy 
~~hes;~~~~~~~~ rate and financial crises yielded a consensus among academics and 
policy makers as to the need to restructure the international monetary,system as an in­
dispensable condition for the world economy, and particularly the emerglO9,economles, to 
see a return to periods of expansion and economic prospenty, Whlle there 15 a consensus 
that the international monetary system needs restructuríng, the same cannot yet be sald 
with regard to the mechanisms proposed to mitigate and/or put an end to IOstabllity 10 
world exchange and financial markets, On this point, Eichengreen (1999: chapters 6 an~ 
7) Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Davidson (1994: chapter 16, and 2002: chapter 1.4) an 
Is~rd (2005: chapters 7 and 8) offer a summary of the main options for restructunng the 
ínternational monetary system. 
6 The neolíberal measures advocated for emergíng countries by the washington consensu~ 
are as follows: (i) reduction or elimination of tariff barners; (11) free cap,ltal moblllty~ whe. 
ther for foreign investment or for convertible currency transactlOns; (111) fiscal discipline, 
(iv) tax reform; (v) financiar deregulation; and (VI) pnvatlzatlons. 
7 It is important to add that the conventional theory argues that a :esponsible economic 
policy is based on flexible exchange rate, capital mobllity and mflatlon targetmg regl~~,_ 
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~xchange rat.e crises in emerging countries. While Brazilian policy 
Implementatlon was no~ without fault, the argument presented 
her~" through comparatlve analysis, supports a more heterodox 
posltlon. . 
SUPP?rt for,post-~eynes~an positions might be surprising given the 
cert~ln~y w,lth ~hlch malnstream economists and international fi­
nanc!alln~tltutl~ns',such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
conslder IIberall~atlon of capital accounts. They endorsed largely 
unregulated capital markets, capital mObility, and a perfectly flexi­
~Ie ex~hange rate (IMF, 2002)8. Under such a regime, domestic 
fina.nClal as~ets (securities) are regarded as perfect substitutes 
for .lnternatlon~1 securities, and thus effective monetary policy is 
defi~ed by panty between domestic and international interest ra­
tes, I.e. monetary expansion brings down domestic interest rates 
to levels below the international rate, leading to capital flight and 
consequent exc~ange rate devaluation, whose beneficial effects on 
current tran~actlo~s come to generate an expansion in aggregate 
demand,.whlch, ralses domestic interest rates until equilibrium is 
re-estabhshed In the balance of payments; symmetrical effects 
are produced by restrictive monetary policy. 
Economi.sts fr~m this ,liberal position argue that a flexible exchange 
rate r~glme wlth capital account convertibility is fundamental for 
emerg.lng countri~s to absorb the capital inflow and respond to the 
changlng productlve capacity in these economies (Edwards and 
Sava:tano, 2000; Edison, Levine, Ricci and Slok, 2002; Fischer, 
199,8, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). Accordingly¡ the benefits of a 
fl~xlble exch~nge rate and unregulated capital flows for an emer­
glng mar~~t IS that these policies (i) reduce the sources of external 
v~l~erab"lty, an? (ii~ increase the autonomy of monetary policy. 
Slmllarl~, financlal .lIberali,~ati?n .(i) allocates efficiently savings 
(dom~~tl,c and forelgn)¡ (11) disciplines macroeconomic policies¡ 
and (111) Improves the economic growth performance. 
Set ag~inst this i~ t~e, perceived need to preserve the autonomy of 
e~erglng c,ountnes fiscal and, more importantly, monetary policy. 
Thl~ has relnforced the opinion of heterodox economists and some 
pollcy makers of the necessity of introducing capital controls and 
an exch,ange rate regime that prevents excessive exchange rate 
fluctuatlons. They argue that such policy autonomy is fundamental 
8 In fact, ,one of the areas which concerned the IMF considerably about Argentina was its 
convertlblhty plan (Slustein, 2006). 
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to assuring sustainable economic growth and harmonious sod 
development. This is particularly important given that developin 
countries suffer from more volatility than developed countries an 
this contributes to recessions of longer duration (Hausmann¡ Pri' 
chett and Rodrik, 2004). Heterodox approaches insist on the neE 
of an exchange rate regime that can prevent excessive exchan~ 
rate fluctuations and external vulnerability. 
Brazil: macroeconomic instabiJity and economic growth ala stO) 
and-go 
In 1994¡ Brazil implemented the Real Plan, an exchange-ra 
based stabilization plan designed to reduce inflation without pn 
ducing a negative shock to growth. The Real Plan differed fro 
Argentina's Convertibility Plan in that it adopted a more flexit 
exchange rate anchor. At the launch of the Brazilian program 
July of 1994, the government's commitment was to maintain , 
exchange rate ceiling of one-to-one parity with the dollar. More 
ver, the relationship between changes in the monetary base a 
foreign reserve movements was not explicitly stated¡ allowi 
some discretionary leeway. After the Mexican crisis in early 19S 
the exchange rate policy was reviewed and, in the context 01 
crawlíng exchange rate range, the nominal rate began to under 
gradual devaluation. 
The Real Plan was successful in reducing inflation from quadrul 
to single digits, due to the combination of exchange rate app 
ciation, high interest rates and a huge reduction in import taxE 
However, the expansion of demand¡ which had emerged from 1 
fiscal side, and the overvalued exchange rate created immedi¡ 
difficulties for Brazil's external sector where in 1994 the trc 
balance was around USO lOA billion in surplus and the curn 
account was in balance, and from 1995 to 1998 the trade balal 
accumulated a deficit of around USO 22.3 billion and the curr 
account registered a deficit around USO 105.6 billion. As a re! 
of this external imbalance, the Brazilian economy suffered mi 
speculative attacks on the real, a "mix of a 'contagious crisis' , 
sing out of the effects on Brazil of the [Mexican crisis,] East A= 
and RIJssian crises and an outbreak of speculative activity trig 
red by market operators who perceived evident macroecono 
imbalances in Brazil" (Ferrari Filho and Paula, 2003: 77). 
9 In August 1994, the Srazilian government reduced tariffs on ímports of more than l 
products, to a maximum of 20 percent. 
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~xchange ra~e crises in emerging countries. While Brazilian pOlicy 
Implementatlon was not without fault¡ the argument presented 
her~~ through comparative analysis¡ supports a more heterodox 
posltlon. . 
,SUPP?rt for.p0st-~eynes~an positions might be surprising given the 
cert~m~y w.lth .wh1ch mamstream economísts and international fi­
nanc.,alm~t'tut,~ns¡.such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)¡ 
conslder IIberall~atlon of capital accounts. They endorsed largely 
unregulated capital markets¡ capital mobility¡ and a perfectly flexi­
~Ie ex~hange rate (IMF¡ 2002)8. Under such a regime¡ domestic 
fina.nClal as~ets (securities) are regarded as perfect substitutes 
for ,mternatlon~1 securities¡ and thus effective monetary policy is 
defi~ed by parrty between domestic and ínternational interest ra­
tes¡ I.e. monetary expansíon brings down domestic interest rates 
:0 levels below the international rate¡ leading to capital flight and 
~onsequent exc~ange rate devaluation¡ whose beneficial effects on 
_urrent tran~actlo~s come to generate an expansion in aggregate 
~emand¡.WhlCh, ralses domestic interest rates until equilibrium is 
e-establlshed m the balance of payments; symmetrical effects 
3re produced by restrictive monetary policy. 
~conomi.sts fr~m this ,liberal position argue that a flexible exchange 
ate r~glme wlth, capital account convertibility is fundamental for 
:mer~mg countn~s to abso~b the capital inflow and respond to the 
:hangmg productlve ~apaclty in these economies (Edwards and 
)avastano¡ 2000; Edlson¡ Levine, Ricci and Slok 2002' Fischer: 
,99,8; Obstfeld and Rogoff¡ 1995). Accordingly¡ the ben¡efits of ~ 
I~xlble exch~nge rate and unregulated capital flows for an emer­
mg mar~~t IS that these policies (i) reduce the sources of external 
~1~erab"lty¡ an? (ii~ increase the autonomy of monetary policy. 
Imllarl~¡ finanClal ,llberali.~ati?n ,(i) allocates efficiently savings 
jom~~tl,c and forelgn), (11) disciplines macroeconomic pOlicíes¡ 
nd (1/1) Improves the economic growth performance. 
et ag~inst this i~ t~e, perceived need to preserve the autonomy of 
~ergmg c:ountnes fiscal and¡ more importantly, monetary policy. 
11~ has remforced the opinion of heterodox economists and some 
)lIcy makers of the necessity of introducing capital controls and 
1 exch,ange rate regime that prevents excessive exchange rate 
Jctuatlons. They argue that such policy autonomy is fundamental 
n fact, ,one of the areas which concerned the IMF considerably about Argentina was its 
wertlblllty plan (Blustein{ 2006), 
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to assuring sustainable economic growth and harmonious social 
development. This is particularly important g/ven that developing 
countries suffer from more volatility than developed countries and 
this contributes to recessions of longer duration (Hausmann, Prit­
chett and Rodrik¡ 2004). Heterodox approaches insist on the need 
of an exchange rate regime that can prevent excessive exchange 
rate fluctuations and external vulnerability. 
Brazi/: macroeconomic ínstability and economic growth ¿ la stop­
and-go 
In 1994, Brazíl implemented the Real Plan, an exchange-rate 
based stabilizatíon plan designed to reduce inflation without pro­
ducing a negative shock to growth. The Real Plan differed from 
Argentina's Convertibility Plan in that it adopted a more flexible 
exchange rate anchor. At the launch of the Brazilian program in 
July of 1994, the government's commitment was to maintain an 
exchange rate ceiling of one-to-one parity with the dollar. Moreo­
ver, the relationship between changes in the monetary base and 
foreign reserve movements was not explicitly stated, allowing 
some discretionary leeway. After the Mexican crisis in early 1995¡ 
the exchange rate policy was reviewed and, in the context of a 
crawling exchange rate range, the nominal rate began to undergo 
gradual devaluation. 
The Real Plan was successful in reducing inflation from quadruple 
to single digits, due to the combination of exchange rate appre­
ciation, high interest rates and a huge reduction in import taxes9 • 
However, the expansion of demand, which had emerged from the 
fiscal side, and the overvalued exchange rate created immediate 
difficulties for Brazil's external sector where in 1994 the trade 
balance was around USO 10.4 bUllon in surplus and the current 
account was in balance, and from 1995 to 1998 the trade balance 
accumulated a deficit of around USO 22.3 billion and the current 
account regístered a deficit around USO 105.6 billion. As a result 
of this externa! imbalance, the Brazilian economy suffered many 
speculative attacks on the real, a "mix of a 'contagious crisis' ari­
sing out of the effects on Brazil of the [Mexican crisis,] East Asían 
and Russian crises and an outbreak of speculative activity trígge­
red by market operators who perceived evident macroeconomic 
imbalances in Brazil" (Ferrarí Filho and Paula, 2003: 77). 
9 In August 1994, the Brazilian government reduced taríffs on imports of more than 4,000 
products, to a maximum of 20 percent. 
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The macroeconomic position of the government was further aggra­
vated during the 1998 presidential electoral campaign. Given the 
polítical constraints of being a candidate for reelectíon, FHC was 
loathe to weaken the currency regime and was forced to defend 
~he real. This necessitated the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) raising 
Interest rates and selling dollar reserves (Spanakos and Rennó 
2006). Despite offers of support and efforts to lend credibility t~ 
Brazilian policy makers from the IMF, capital continued to flow out 
of the country and foreign reserves fell rapidly during the course 
of the campaign and even after the reelection of president FHC. 
Finally, in January 1999, under the circumstances of macroeco­
nomic imbalances and uncertainties about the Real Plan's future 
the FHC government changed the exchange rate and allowed th~ 
real to float. The government had battled to protect the exchan­
ge regime at considerable cost in terms of reserves and growth 
but now believed that by floating the currency, it would be les~ 
vulnerable to future speculative attacks. 
But, given the history of inflation and the low appetite for risk 
among investors, the new floating regime was tested to see where 
the new range ofthe real would be. This pressure on the exchange 
rate let to the adoption of a set of economic policies based on an 
inflation targeting regime (IT) and primary fiscal surplus. Since 
1999, these three principies have been considered fundamental 
to Brazilian macroeconomic policy. 
Growth during the 19805 and 19905 had been low and volatile 
but the expectation was that once inflation had been eliminated' 
Brazil could resume the high levels of growth it experienced fro~ 
the post War period until the Debt Crisis. Y~t, since beginning of 
the 21st century, the Brazilian economy continues to display pat­
terns of low and volatile growth. Moreover, since the Real Plan 
the GDP growth rate has been low and has had a 'stop-and-go' 
pattern: between 1995 and 2006, the average GDP growth was 
2.7%. This low economic growth can be explained by (i) the ex­
ternal vulnerability (from 1995 to 2003) due to the process of 
financial liberalization 10, (ii) the high real interest rates (the ave­
rage nominal interest rate, between 1995 and 2006, was around 
23.8% per year), (iii) a recessive fiscal policy (maintenance of 
10 The financialliberalísation incfuded both facilitation to outward transactions (elimination 
of the hmlts that resldents can convert real in foreign currencies, with the end of the CCS 
accounts) and IOward transactions (fiscal incentives to foreign investors to buy domestic 
public securitíes). 
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primary surpluses to reduce debt, especially since 1999), al 
(iv) an exchange rate appreciation (from 1995 to 1998 and aga 
since 2003). 
Under the IT regime, monetary policy is taken as the main in 
trument of macroeconomic policy. That is, the focus of moneta 
policy is on price stability, along with three objectives: credibili 
(the framework should command trust); flexibility (the framewc 
should allow monetary policy to react optimally to unanticipat 
shocks); and legitimacy (the framework should attract public a 
parliamentary support). Credibility is recognized as param.OL 
in the conduct of monetary policy to avoid problems assoClat 
with time-inconsistency. Moreover, monetary poliCy is viewed 
the most direct determinant of inflation, so much so that in t 
long run the inflation rate is the only macroeconomic varial 
that monetary policy can affect. Finally, it is argued that mor 
tary policy cannot affect economic activity, for example out¡ 
or employment, in the long runo The results, however, sugg 
otherwise. Table 3 (annex) shows a consistently high interest re 
and a sharp instability of the nominal exchange rateo For exam 
from 2000 to 2006, the average nominal basic interest rate (Se 
was 18.2% per year, and the exchange rate movement was ql 
unstable -from 2000 to 2003 it was devaluated and, since 201 
it has been appreciated. 
Monetary authorities have operated with a clear and heavy p 
ference for maintaining low inflation. Given this priority, the E 
has maintained high interest rates which discourage monet 
expansion and are recessionary in nature. Rísíng interest r 
punishes firms, by reducing their access to credit, and workE 
who lose their jobs when firms face difficulties, but reward r 
tíers and speculators, who hold publiC securities. Ironically, 
expansion of Brazilian debt markets signaled in the Goldman Sa 
reports cited aboye has been consistent with a decline in out 
and employment, and, at the same time, increased the VOIL 
of public debt. 
In terms of fiscal policy, inflation targeting regimes view do 
view fiscal policy as a powerful macroeconomic instrument (in 
case it is hostage to the slow and uncertain legislative proce 
inst~ad "monetary policy moves first and dominates, forcing fi 
políCY to align with monetary policy" (Mishkin, 2000: 4). Si 
implementing the IT regime, the Brazilían government has m 
tained high target goals for primary surplus (of 4.25% of ( 
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The macroeconom ic position of the government was further aggra­
vated during the 1998 presidential electoral campaign. Given the 
political constraints of being a candidate for reelection, FHC was 
loathe to weaken the currency regime and was forced to defend 
,the real. This necessitated the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) raising 
interest rates and selling dollar reserves (Spanakos and Rennó, 
2006). Despite offers of support and efforts to lend credibility to 
Brazilian policy makers from the IMF, capital continued to flow out 
of the country and foreign reserves fell rapidly during the course 
of the campaign and even after the reelection of president FHC. 
Final/y, in January 1999, under the circumstances of macroeco­
nomic irnbalances and uncertaintíes about the Real Plan's future, 
the FHC government changed the exchange rate and allowed the 
real to float. The government had battled to protect the exchan­
ge regime at considerable cost in terms of reserves and growth, 
but now believed that by floating the currency, it would be less 
vulnerable to future speculative attacks. 
But, given the history of inflation and the low appetite for risk 
among investors, the new floating regime was tested to see where 
~he new range of the real would be. This pressure on the exchange 
rate let to the adoption of a set of economic policies based on an 
inflation targeting regime (IT) and primary fiscal surplus. Since 
1999, these three principies have been considered fundamental 
z:o Brazilian macroeconomic policy. 
;:lrowth during the 19805 and 1990s had been low and volatile , 
,ut the expectation was that once inflation had been eliminated 
Srazil could resume the high levels of growth it experienced fro~ 
~he post War period until the Debt Crisis. Y~t, since beginning of 
:he 21st century, the Brazilian economy continues to display pat­
:erns of low and volatile growth. Moreover, since the Real Plan 
rhe GDP growth rate has been low and has had a 'stop-and-go' 
:>attern: between 1995 and 2006, the average GDP growth was 
.7%. This low economic growth can be explained by (i) the ex­
ernal vulnerability (from 1995 to 2003) due to the process of~í'nancial liberalization lO, (ii) the high real interest rates (the ave­
tage nominal interest rate, between 1995 and 2006, was around 
r3.8% per year), (iii) a recessive fiscal policy (maintenance of 
~-~~-_ •.. 
The financíalliber~lisation in.cluded both. facilitation to outward transactions (elimination 
, the Ilmlts that resldents can convert real in foreign currencíes, with the end of the CCS 
, counts) and inward transactlons (fiscal Incentives to foreign investors to buy domestic 
lublíc securities). 
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primary surpluses to reduce debt, especially since 1999), a~d 
(iv) an exchange rate appreciation (from 1995 to 1998 and agaln 
since 2003). 
Under the IT regime¡ monetary policy is taken as the main ins­
trument of macroeconomic policy. That is, the focus of monetary 
policy is on price stability¡ along with tt"lree objectives: credibility 
(the framework should command trust); flexibility (the framework 
should allow monetary policy to react optimally to unanticipated 
shocks); and legitimacy (the framework should attract public and 
parliamentary support). Credibility is recognized as paramount 
in the conduct of monetary policy to avoid problems associated 
with time-inconsistency. Moreover, monetary policy is viewed as 
the most direct determinant of inflation, so much so that in the 
long run the inflation rate is the only macroeconomic variable 
that monetary policy can affect. Finally, it is argued that mone­
tary policy cannot affect economic activity, for example output 
or employment, in the long runo The results, however, suggest 
otherwise. Table 3 (annex) shows a consistently high interest rate 
and a sharp instability of the nominal exchange rateo For exarnple 
from 2000 to 2006, the average nominal basic interest rate (Selic) 
was 18.2% per year¡ and the exchange rate movement was quite 
unstable -from 2000 to 2003 it was devaluated and, since 2003, 
it has been appreciated. 
Monetary authorities have operated with a clear and heavy pre­
ference for maintaining low inflation. Given this priority¡ the BCB 
has maintained high interest rates which discourage monetary 
expansion and are recessionary in nature. Rising interest rate 
punishes firms, by reducing their access to credit, and workers, 
who lose their jobs when firms face difficulties, but reward ren­
tiers and speculators, who hold publiC securities. Ironically¡ the 
expansion of Brazilian debt markets signaled in the Goldman Sachs 
reports cited aboye has been consistent with a decline in output 
and employment, and, at the same time, increased the volume 
of public debt. 
In terms of fiscal policy, inflation targeting regimes view do not 
view fiscal policy as a powerful macroeconomic instrument (in any 
case, it is hostage to the slow and uncertain legislative process), 
instead "monetary policy moves first and dominates, forcing fiscal 
policy to align with monetary pOlicy" (Mishkin, 2000: 4). Since 
implementing the IT regime, the Brazilian government has main­
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during the period of 2000 to 2006), in order to guarantee the ser­
vice of outstanding public debt. Despite the very significant fiscal 
constraint, net public debt as a percentage of GDP increased from 
48.0% to 50.0% during that time periodo Primary fiscal surplus 
has contributed to lowering debt, but the external vulnerability 
which was exposed in 2002-2003 led to an explosion of debt. 
Therefore, while fiscal surplus may be a medicine with long term 
value, it may have contributed to the conditions which increased 
short and medium term debt stock, which further emphasizes 
the point about volatility of growth associated with the Brazilian 
government's adoption of the IT regime. 
As Table 3 (annex) shows, since the end of 2003, the nominal 
exchange rate has been appreciated trending towards overvaluing, 
basically due to both increase of the trade surplus and capital 
flows. The growth of trade surplus is a result of an increasing of 
world demand for Brazilian products and an increase in commodi­
ty prices (mineral and agricultural) while capital flows have been 
attracted by high yield differentials between domestic and foreign 
bonds. Under these conditions, there has been a reduction of ex­
ternal indebtedness, an improvement of the jndicators of external 
vulnerability and foreign reserves have increased from USD 33.0 
billion in 2000 to almost USD 86.0 billion in 2006. However, there 
is a great deal of concern about the future of the trade balance 
and current account performances. This is due essentially to two 
reasons: (1) continuous real exchange rate appreciation reduced 
the growth rate of exports in 2006, and (ii) the possible reduction 
in the volume of the international trade, mainly commodities, if 
a decline in the economic growth of USA and China were to ma­
terializell . 
Despite the better international conditions and the growth of ex­
ports, from 2002 to 2006, GDP maintained the same 'stop-and­
go' pattern it has displayed since stabilization, and if not since 
the early 1980s. Both the average growth rate and the volatility 
of growth are insufficient for the needs of the Brazilian popula­
tion, augur poorly for investment, and are not competitive when 
compared with those of other large emerging countries over the 
same period. 
11 Brazilian exports are still very much concentrated on agricultural and mineral com­
moditíes, such as soy, steel and iron, natural resources, and technological low-íntensive 
industrial products, whíle there is an important presence ín íts import contents of products 
that rely extensively on technology. 
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To conclude, the Brazilian economic performance, from 200C 
2006 shows the following characteristics: (i) despite the fact t 
jnflatíon rate was kept under control, its average rate was relati\i 
high at 7.4% per year on average since the introduction of th~ 
regime; (ji) the annual nominal interest rate was aro~nd 18 . .l 
while the average real interest rate was around 10.0 Yo per ye 
and (iii) the average annual growth rate of GDP was only 3.1 
Thus even without comparative analysis, there are reasom 
reco~sider the appropriateness of the IT regime for Brazil. 
China: economic growth with managed exchange rate and t 
tricted capital ínflows 
Annual average rate of GDP for China between 1995 and 20061 
a blistering 9.37%. This high growth rate is largely due to 
growth of the export sector12 and is fueled by investment (~t 
expanded from 34.1% in 1999 to 41.6% in 2006). ~xpanslol 
investment in China is very obviously a result of the (1) open-c 
policy initiated in the 1980s, and (ii) of state participation in b 
credit and low interest rates13 • 
Economic openness in Chinese economy was gradual and tt 
were three phases in attracting capital flows (Shengman, 19~ 
Between 1980 and 1986 was a period of "m utual learning" w~ 
Chinese authorities and population and foreign investors lear 
from each other. Foreign direct investment (FDI) ventures in 
na started in the 19805 when the Special Economic Zones IJ 
created and at the same time, economic policies were implerr 
ted14. The s~cond phase (1987-1991) was one of"getting rea 
during which laws and regulations were created and measl 
were adopted to attract foreign investment to dlfferent ec( 
mic sectors and geographic locations. Finally, since 1992, ti 
has been the "rapid increase" phased, characterized by the r, 
transformation in Chinese economy (from a planned econom 
a market economy). During this period, China benefited fro 
shíft in global allocation of private investment towards emer' 
12 In the 19805, the China's share in the world trade was around 0.8% while in the, 

It was almost 8.0%. 

13 Accordmg to OECD (2005), the relation banking credit/GDP, under a bank-based s 

dominated by state-owned banks, has been almost double compared to OECD are, 

14 In the beginning, foreign direct investment (FDI) was highly regulated, but 

1990s there were some changes introduced to encourage FDI, such as effectlve tar 
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during the period of 2000 to 2006), in order to guarantee the ser­
vice of outstanding public debt. Despite the very significant fiscal 
constraint, net public debt as a percentage of GDP increased from 
48.0% to 50.0% during that time periodo Primary fiscal surplus 
has contributed to lowering debt, but the external vulnerability 
which was exposed in 2002-2003 led to an explosion of debt. 
Therefore, while fiscal surplus may be a medicine with long term 
value, it may have contributed to the conditions which increased 
short and medium term debt stock, which furtt:ler emphasizes 
the point about volatility of growth associated with the Brazilian 
government's adoption of the IT regime. 
As Table 3 (annex) shows, since the end of 2003, the nominal 
exc~ange rate has been appreciated trending towards overvaluing, 
baslcal~y due to both increase of the trade surplus and capital 
fiows. rhe growth of trade surplus is a result of an increasing of 
world demand for Brazilian products and an increase in commodi­
Ity prices (mineral and agricultural) while capital flows have been 
iattracted by high yield differentials between domestic and foreign 
ibonds. Under these conditions, there has been a reduction of ex­
ternal indebtedness, an improvement of the indicators of external 
vulnerability and foreign reserves have increased from USD 33.0 
pillion in 2000 to almost USD 86.0 billion in 2006. However, there 
is a great deal of concern about the future of the trade balance 
and current account performances. This is due essentially to two 
reasons: (i) continuous real exchange rate appreciation reduced 
~he growth rate of exports in 2006, and (H) the possible reduction 
In the volume of the international trade¡ mainly commodities if 
p decline in the economic growth of USA and China were to ~a­
terializell . 
Despite the better international conditions and the growth of ex­
ports, from 2002 to 2006, GDP maintained the same 'stop-and­
gol pattern it has displayed since stabilization, and if not since 
~he early 1980~. Bo~h. the average growth rate and the volatility 
~f growth are InsufAclent for the needs of the Brazilian popula­
r,on, augur poorly for investment, and are not competitive when 




1 Br~zilian exports are still very much concentrated on agricultural and mineral com­
odltles, such as soy, steel and iron, natural resources, and technological low-intensive 
. dustnal products, while there is an important presence in its import contents of products 
at rely extensívely on technology. ~ 
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To conclude, the Brazilian economic performance, from 2000 to 
2006, shows the following characteristics: (i) despite the fact that 
inflation rate was kept under control, its average rate was relatively 
high at 7.4% per year on average since the introduction of the IT 
regime; (ji) the annual nominal interest rate was around 18.2%, 
while the average real interest rate was around 10.0% per year; 
and (iji) the average annual growth rate of GDP was only 3.1%. 
Thus, even without comparative analysis, there are reasons to 
reconsider the appropriateness of the IT regime for Brazil. 
China: economíc growth with managed exchange rate and res­
trícted capital inflows 
Annual average rate of GDP for China between 1995 and 2006 was 
a blistering 9.37%. Thjs high growth rate is largely due to the 
growth of the export sector12 and is fueled by investment (which 
expanded from 34.1% in 1999 to 41.6% in 2006). Expansion of 
investment in China is very obviously a result of the (i) open-door 
policy initiated in the 1980s, and (ii) of state participation in bank 
credit and low interest rates13 • 
Economic openness in Chinese economy was gradual and there 
were three phases in attracting capital flows (Shengman, 1999). 
Between 1980 and 1986 was a period of "m utual learning" where 
Chinese authorities and population and foreign investors learned 
from each other. Foreign direct investment (FDI) ventures in Chi­
na started in the 1980s when the Special Economic Zones were 
created and, at the same time, economic policíes were implemen­
ted 14 • The second phase (1987-1991) was one of"getting ready," 
duríng which laws and regulations were created and measures 
were adopted to attract foreign ínvestment to different eco no­
míc sectors and geographic locations. Finally, sínce 1992, there 
has been the "rapld íncrease" phased, characterized by the rapid 
transformation in Chinese economy (from a planned economy to 
a market economy). During this period, China benefited from a 
shift in global allocation of private investment towards emerging 
12 In the 1980s, the Chína's share in the world trade was around 0.8% while in the 20005 
it was almost 8.0%. 
13 According to OECD (2005), the relation banking credit/GDP, under a bank-based system 
dominated by state-owned banks, has been almost double compared to OECD area. 
14 In the beginning, foreign direct investment (FDI) was highly regulated, but in the 
1990s there were some changes introduced to encourage FDI, such as effective tariffs on 
imports were reduced, the public corporations were modernized and the exchange rate 
regime changed. 
I 
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mark~ts: According to Paula (2007: 27), "[m]ajor changes in the 
functlonmg of the economy were introduced in the 1990s, such as 
encouragement of foreign investment, reduction of effective ta­
riffs on imported inputs, the modernization of public corporations 
the abolition of multiple exchange rates, and the introduction of 
convertibility for current account transactions". 
China has been the principal recipient of foreign capital flows in 
recent years among emerging markets. Such capital inflows can 
cause ~everal macroeconomic effects,' such as, expanding the 
domestlc money supply and putting pressure on the domestic 
prices and the exchange rateo However, this has not happened for 
~he p.eriod under study here1S • From 1997 to 2006, the average 
mflatlon rate was 0.79% per year. China did suffer from a short 
period of high inflation in the mid-1990s (more specifically in 1995 
and ~996, when t,he average inflation rate was 8.5% per year), 
but slnce 1997 Chma has experienced periods of deflation (1998, 
1999,2001 and 2002) and low inflation rates, excepting 200416 . In 
other words, inflation rates have been under control and moderate 
despite the tremendous capital inflows that the Chinese economy 
has had to accommodate over the past decade and a half. This 
has b~en p~ssible beca use of flexible monetary policy and fiscal 
austenty enJoyed by the Chinese monetary authorities, particularly 
the Popular Bank of China (PBC), the Chinese central bank. 
The PBC has managed the domestic money supply in order to 
absorb the capital inflows and soften their effect on macroeco­
nomic indicators. Ouring the 1990s, it applied credit restrictions 
to financial institutions, while in the 2000s monetary policy was 
more flexible - according to Table 4 (annex), the average interest 
rate was 3.0% per year, from 1998 to 200617 • This means that 
the average real interest rate (average nominal interest rate di­
vided by average inflation rate) from 1998 to 2006 was 2.1% per 
year. Moreover,. Ch~na has shielded the domestic financial system 
from these capital mflows because there are (i) limitations on the 
~ntry of ~o~eign banks in the financial market, and (ii) convertibi ­
hty restnctlons on the foreign currency transactions of domestic 
financial institutions. 
15 Prices have íncreased sínce 2007. 
16 This inflation rate was calculated by the authors according to the data of Table 4. 
17 The average interest rate was calculated by the authors according to the data of Table 4. 
ENSAYOS DE ECONOMiA No, 32,2008: 15·41 
Fernando Ferrari-Filho, Anthony Spanakos 
Ouring the Chinese transition from a closed to an open econon 
the exchange rate regime has changed severa I times and ~ 
been the main instrument of economic policy. After a long peri 
of centralized and fixed exchange rate regimes, in the 1990s, , 
exchange rate was devalued and a managed floating exchange rc 
regime was adopted. The yuan has been de tacto 'fixed' to the 
dollar since the end of the 1990s (Table 4, in annex, shows ti 
relative stabílity of the exchange rate from 1995 to 2006). Sir 
then PBC's intervention to maintain a stable exchange rate t,
been significant largely due to capital control mechanisms on b, 
inflows and outf1owS18 • In 2005, the Chinese monetary authorit 
revaluated the exchange rate against the dollar of 2.1%. Moreol 
they introduced a system in which the exchange rate would 
determined by a basket of currencies. In other words, the PBC 
acted as a market maker in the foreign exchange market. 
As mentioned above, the management of the exchange rate 
been possi ble due to the existence of capital controls on both 
flows and outflows. AcCording to Zhao (2006: 8), capital cont 
in China have the following objectives: (i) it helps direct extel 
savings to desired uses; (ii) it keeps monetary policy indepenc 
of the influence of international developments, under a conl 
of a managed exchange rate regime; (jii) it prevents firms 
financial institutions from taking excessive external risks; (i l 
maintains balance of payments equilibrium and keeps excha 
rate stability; and (v) it insulates the economy from foreigl 
nancial crises. 
With a stable exchange rate, increasing trade surplus and infl 
of FOP9, China has accumulated an impressive amount of ir 
national reserves (from USO 186.3 billion in 2000 to USO 1,01 
billion in 2006). As a consequence ofthe continuous trade sur~ 
the expressive accumulation of international reserves, the ca 
controls mechanisms and a low level of externa I debt, exte 
vulnerability is low. This was evident by the insulation of the 
nese economy during the numerous emerging market crises !: 
1995, but especially during the Asían Crisis. 
18 Capital controls in China has been used to keep monetary policy independent, to p 

firms and financial institutions from taking external risks, to maintain balance of pay 

equilibrium and keep exchange rate and to avoid the economy from foreign financí 

exchange rate crises. 

19 It is important to add that FDI has been attracted by the long-term growth pers¡: 

of Chlnese economy. 
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nark~ts: According to Paula (2007: 27), "[m]ajor changes in the 
unctlonrng of the economy were introduced in the 19905, such as 
!ncouragement of foreign investment, reduction of effective ta­
iffs on imported inputs, the modernization of public corporations 
he abolition of multiple exchange rates, and the introduction of 
onvertibility for current account transactionslt• 
:hina has been the principal recipient of foreign capital flows in 
ecent years among emerging markets. Such capital inllows can 
ause ~everal macroeconomic effects, such as, expanding the 
omestlC money supply and putting pressure on the domestic 
rices and the exchange rateo However, this has not happened for 
le ~riod under study here1S • From 1997 to 2006, the average 
Iflatlon rate was 0.79% per year. China did suffer from a short 
eriod of high inflation in the mid-1990s (more specifically in 1995 
nd ~996, when t.he average ínflation rate was 8.5% per year), 
ut srnce 1997 Chrna has experienced periods of deflation (1998, 
~99, 2001 and 2002) and low inflation rates, excepting 200416 , In 
:her words, inflation rates have been under control and moderate 
~spite the tremendous capital inflows that the Chinese economy 
:15 had to accommodate over the past decade and a half. This 
:15 been possible because of flexible monetary pOlicy and fiscal 
Jsterity enjoyed by the Chinese monetary authorities, particularly 
e Popular Bank of China (PBC), the Chinese central bank. 
le PBC has managed the domestic money supply in order to 
lsorb the capital inflows and soften their effect on macroeco­
)mic indicators. Ouring the 19905, it applied credit restrictions 
financial institutions, while in the 20005 monetary policy was 
Jre flexible - according to Table 4 (annex), the average interest 
te was 3.0% per year, from 1998 to 200617 • This means that 
e average real interest rate (average nominal interest rate di­
jed by average intlation rate) from 1998 to 2006 was 2.1 % per 
ar. Moreover, China has shielded the domestic financial system 
)m these capital inflows beca use there are (;) limitations on the 
try of ~oreign banks in the financial market, and (ii) convertibi­
( restnctions on the foreign currency transactions of domestic 
ancial institutions. 
Ouring the Chinese transition from a closed to an open economy, 
the exchange rate regime has changed severa I times and has 
been the main instrument of economic policy. After a long period 
of centralized and fixed exchange rate regimes, in the 1990s, the 
exchange rate was devalued and a managed floating exchange rate 
regime was adopted. The yuan has been de (acto 'fixed' to the US 
dollar since the end of the 19905 (Table 4, in annex, shows that 
relative stability of the exchange rate from 1995 to 2006). Since 
then, PBCs intervention to maintain a stable exchange rate has 
been significant largely due to capital control mechanisms on both 
inflows and outflowS18 • In 2005, the Chinese monetary authorities 
reval uated the excha nge rate agai nst the dolla r of 2.1%. Moreover, 
they introduced a system in which the exchange rate would be 
determined by a basket of currencies. In other words, the PBC has 
acted as a market maker in the foreign exchange market. 
As mentioned above, the management of the exchange rate has 
been possible due to the existence of capital controls on both in­
flows and outflows. According to Zhao (2006: 8), capital controls 
in China have the following objectives: (i) it helps direct external 
savings to desired uses; (ii) it keeps monetary policy independent 
of the influence of international developments, under a context 
of a managed exchange rate regime; (iii) it prevents firms and 
financial institutions from taking excessive external risks; (iv) it 
maintains balance of payments equilibrium and keeps exchange 
rate stability; and (v) it insulates the economy from foreign fi ­
nancial crises. 
With a stable exchange rate, increasing trade surplus and inflows 
of FOp9, China has accumulated an impressive amount of inter­
national reserves (from USO 186.3 billion in 2000 to USO 1,068.5 
billion in 2006). As a consequence of the continuous trade surplus, 
the expressive accumulation of international reserves, the capital 
controls mechanisms and a low level of external debt, externa I 
vulnerability is low. This was evident by the insulation of the Chi­
nese economy during the numerous emerging market crises since 
1995, but especially during the Asían Crisis. 
)rices have increased since 2007. 

-hís inflatíon rate was calcuJated by the authors according to the data of Table 4. 

ñe average interest rate was caJculated by the authors according to the data of TabJe 4. 

18 Capital controls in China has been used to keep monetary policy índependent, to prevent 
firms and financial instítutions from taking external risks, to maintain balance of payments 
equilibrium and keep exchange rate and to avoid the economy from foreign financial and 
exchange rate crises. 
19 It is important to add that FDI has been attracted by the long-term growth perspective 
of Chinese economy. 
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Chinese fiscal policy has complemented monetary policy with a 
careful eye to maintain polícymaking autonomy and limit externa I 
vulnerabilities. As public companies shifted towards mixed and 
private concerns, the government acquired considerable state and 
quasi-state debt. It did this through by increasingly shaving the 
government deficit with a tendency towards balance. As a result 
of conservative fiscal policy and growing state revenues, fiscal 
deficit dropped to 0.7% of GDP in 2006 and domestic debt has 
been stable and mínimal (in 2006 ít was 17.3% of GDP). AII of 
this helps to explain the limited vulnerability of the Chinese eco­
nomy to the fits and starts more typical among emerging markets, 
particularly Brazil. They also have contributed to an environment 
in which robust sustainable growth was possible. 
Conclusion 
This comparative study of Brazilian and Chinese macroeconomic 
policies and outcomes aims to address the puzzle of why the 
Brazilian economy, despite considerable liberal reforms, has not 
produced stable and robust growth. It has done this by compa­
ring Brazil to peers in the BRICs group, gleaning information from 
recent research on the relationship between reforms and growth, 
and by a focused comparative case study with China. The paper 
agrees with the finding in the literature that broad liberal reform 
agendas do not necessarily produce stable and robust economic 
growth. It does find that certain policíes do seem to have more 
of an effect in limiting external vulnerability and in producing 
growth, particularly policies that allow government's to maintain 
autonomy of macroeconomic policies. This confirms Ferrari Filho 
and Paula (2006) who find that economic performance of BRICs 
countries is the result of the exchange rate regime¡ capital ac­
count convertibility and fiscal and monetary regimes adopted in 
each country. 
This suggests the necessity of (i) ensuring that monetary policy 
has a significant positive impact on the level of economic activi­
ty, (ii) directing financial markets toward financing development 
rather than rentíer-like behavio~ and (ni) creating efficient anti ­
speculation mechanisms to control (or regulate) movements of 
capital in order to prevent monetary and exchange rate crises and 
augment the autonomy of domestic decision-makers. Exploring 
the last issue, the main difference among Brazil and China is that, 
paraphrasing and adapting Stiglitz (2002), financial liberalization 
and capital mobility in the Brazilian economy in the 19905 were at 
the center of its currency crisis, wrlile China, due to their measu­
res of capital controls, could manage monetary and fiscal policies 
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pro-economic growth. Interestingly enough, in a panel survey 
49 developing countries between 1970-1995, Gastanaga, NugE 
and Pashamova (1998) find that most policy reforms did not ha 
much of an effect on attracting FDI, though capital controls WE 
associated with an increase in FDI and the most important fad 
was economic growth. 
Uninterrupted and robust economic growth is the goal of all poi 
makers, especially in the developing world. Although .acader 
literature has yet to produce c1ear causal relationshlps wh 
explain the necessary components for such growth and how 
bolster these components, empirical analysis of peer coun 
performance gives valuable signals to policy makers. It may 
difficult to say exactly why, with academic certainty, China t 
grown so robustly and consistently. But when Brazil is compal 
against China¡ a strong case may be made for why growth fT 
be weak and interrupted. 
Summing up, China's case shows how gradual and caref~1 .mal 
gement of capital account and contracyclical economic pollcles ( 
reduce the external vulnerability and assure sustainable econol 
growth, while Brazil's case, on the other hand; sho.ws ~ow 
adoption of a more liberal and orthodox economlc pOII~y, In ter 
of exchange rate and financial liberalization and capl~~1 ac~o 
convertibility, has resulted in higher exchange rate volatlhty, hlg 
interest rates, and a poor economic growth. Table 1, adapted fr 
Paula (2007: 34), shows a comparative synthesis of the anal) 
of the macroeconomic policy of Brazil and China. 
TABLE 1 
Exchange rate regime and capital account convertibility of Brazil and China 
Country Exchange Monetary po- Capital account Exchange ré 
rate regime licy regime convertibility volatility 
From 1995 From 1995 to High HighBrazíl 






Floating, Since 1999: 

with dirty Inflation ta r­
floatin 









Source: Author's elaboration based on Paula (2007). 
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:hinese fiscal pOlicy has complemented monetary policy with a 
:areful eye to maintain policymaking autonomy and limit externa I 
'ulnerabilities. As public companies shífted towards mixed and 
~rivate concerns, the government acquired considerable state and 
~uasi-state debt. It did this through by increasingly shaving the 
government deficit with a tendency towards balance. As a result 
lf conservative fiscal polícy and growing state revenues, fiscal 
jeficit dropped to 0.7% of GDP in 2006 and domestic debt has 
leen stable and mínimal (in 2006 it was 17.3% of GDP). Al! of 
his helps to explain the limited vulnerability of thé Chinese eco­
lomy to the fits and starts more typical among emerging markets, 
iarticularly Brazil. They also have contributed to an environment 
i which robust sustainable growth was possible. 
tonclusion 
his comparative study of Brazilian and Chinese macroeconomic 
olicies and outcomes aims to address the puzzle of why the 
irazilian economy, des pite considerable liberal reforms, has not 
Iroduced stable and robust growth. It has done this by compa­
ng Brazil to peers in the BRICs group, gleaning information from 
ecent research on the relationship between reforms and growth, 
nd by a focused comparative case study with China. The paper 
$Jrees with the finding in the Iiterature that broad liberal reform 
gendas do not necessarily produce stable and robust economic 
rowth. It does find that certain policies do seem to have more 
t an effect in limiting externa I vulnerability and in producing 
rowth, particularly policies that allow government's to maintain 
:Jtonomy of macroeconomic policies. This confirms Ferrari Filho 
hd Paula (2006) who find that economic performance of BRICs 
!>untries is the result of the exchange rate regime, capital ac­
?unt convertibility and fiscal and monetary regimes adopted in 
flch country. 
his suggests the necessity of (i) ensuring that monetary policy 

s a significant positive impact on the level of economic activi ­
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e last issue, the main difference among Brazil and China is that, 
raphrasing and adapting Stiglítz (2002), financial liberalization 
d capital mobility in the Brazilian economy in the 1990s were at 
e center of its currency crisis, whíle China, due to their measu­
l~~~~~apital controls, could manage monetary and fiscal policies 
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pro-economic growth. Interestingly enough, in a panel survey of 
49 developing countries between 1970-1995, Gastanaga, Nugent 
and Pashamova (1998) find that most poliCY reforms did not have 
much of an effect on attracting FDI, though capital controls were 
associated with an increase in FDI and the most important factor 
was economic growth. 
Uninterrupted and robust economic growth is the goal of al! policy 
makers, especially in the developing world. Although academic 
literature has yet to produce clear causal relationships which 
explain the necessary components for such growth and how to 
bolster these components, empirical analysis of peer country 
performance gíves valuable signals to policy makers. It may be 
difficult to say exactly why, with academic certainty, China has 
grown so robustly and consistently. But when Brazil is compared 
against China, a strong case may be made for why growth may 
be weak and interrupted. 
Summing up, China's case shows how gradual and careful mana­
gement of capital account and contracyclical econornic policies can 
reduce the external vulnerability and assure sustainable economic 
growth, while BrazWs case, on the other hand, shows how the 
adoption of a more liberal and orthodox economic policy, in terms 
of exchange rate and financial liberalization and capital account 
convertibility, has resulted in higher exchange rate volatility, higher 
interest rates, and a poor economic growth. Table 1, adapted from 
Paula (2007: 34), shows a comparative synthesis of the analysis 
of the macroeconomic policy of Brazil and China. 
TABLE 1 





Capital account Exchange rate 
convertibility volatility 
Brazil From 1995 From 1995 to High High 




Floating, Since 1999: 
with dirty lnflatíon ta r­
floating I geting 
China Pegged ex­ Contra-cycli- Partíal, with Very low 
change rate cal monetary ma ny restric­
policy tions 
Source: Author's elaboration based on Paula (2007). 
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